As delegates at the EU Parliament’s 2023 Beyond Growth conference were told, addressing climate change and biodiversity loss requires confronting the foundations of the mainstream economic model.
Countries continue to treat rising global output (GDP) as a universal remedy. Yet this aggregate, developed a century ago, cannot capture harm to nature — GDP can increase regardless of how many trees are cut down.
The ideology of growth rests on a modern/colonial logic of separation that treats nature as distinct from humans and as a resource to be exploited without regard for consequences.
From a postcolonial perspective, economic growth functions as a powerful tool for shaping nations and, in the global South, appears as a revived imperialism that drains economic value toward the global North.
Today, this colonial aspect of growth is intensified under the banner of “green growth,” which continues to transform ecological landscapes in the global South, as well as in colonised regions of the North, such as in Sápmi land.
Post-growth scholars, by contrast, argue that economic stability and employment do not have to depend on consumption growth.
“Post-growth futures” imagines an economy and society that prioritise social and environmental well-being instead of continuous economic growth. Wellbeing economics, doughnut economics and degrowth, among others, are all variants of this idea, differing mainly in their approaches to change.
A post-growth future aims to keep consumption within planetary boundaries, asserting that deep social transformation must accompany technological innovation to ease pressure on natural resources and reduce inequalities.
Post-growth futures emphasize simplifying lifestyles and shifting down consumption and indulgence. For example, instead of swapping petrol cars for electric SUVs, the focus should be on cutting the total number of vehicles and prioritising public transport and cycling.
Beyond downshifting, the post-growth agenda also advocates redistributing wealth and income, fostering cooperative and sharing economies and community initiatives such as repair shops, localising economic activity, and strengthening participatory democracy.
Proposals like a basic income to decouple earnings from labour are also part of it. The vision balances social needs with ecological limits and highlights conviviality.
Compared with degrowth scholars, post-growth thinkers may place greater weight on preventing instability that could follow from scaling down economic activity. Some authors argue these shifts will demand robust state intervention to provide financial and structural support, while others emphasise local decision-making.
The strong-state perspective, for instance, suggests governments should create climate-jobs that directly address reduction of emissions, such as jobs building rail infrastructure.
Degrowth and post-growth plans have also been criticised because many countries in the global South still need to grow their GDP.
Yet confining degrowth to the global North can also reproduce ongoing “epistemic violence” by excluding voices from the global South and their experiences with dominant development discourses. The idea of reaching a specific economic threshold rests on a misleading promise of progress and inclusion, and that conceals the harm done to some people and territories in the name of broader public goods—namely, the national economy and its growth.